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INTRODUCTION
The 1965 Immigration Act is heralded as important civil rights
legislation.1 This Act eliminated the national origin quota system,
which was adopted in 1924 and explicitly enshrined white suprem-
acy within the United States’ immigration law.2 The elimination of
national origin quotas based on racial and ethnic desirability was a
necessary step in creating an immigration and citizenship regime
based on fairness and equality. Yet one feature of the national origin
quota system remains with us today—the lawful permanent resi-
dent (LPR) naturalization requirement. After sweeping immigration
* Charles J. Merriam Distinguished Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor
College of Law, Arizona State University.
1. Rose Cuison Villazor & Kevin R. Johnson, The Trump Administration and the
War on Immigration Diversity, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV 575, 579 (2019); see Elizabeth
Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and Citizenship, 14
NEV. L.J. 101, 119, 132 (2013).
2. Villazor & Johnson, supra note 1, at 579; ELIZABETH F. COHEN, ILLEGAL: HOW
AMERICA’S LAWLESS IMMIGRATION REGIME THREATENS US ALL 84–86 (2020); MAE M.
NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 23,
26 (2014); NOELIGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISHBECAMEWHITE 49 (2009). While the immigrants
who were targeted as undesirable in the national origin quotas would be understood as
white within today’s understandings of race and ethnicity, that was not the case in the
early twentieth century. COHEN, supra note 2, at 85–86. For example, influential theories
about race and America’s “native stock” stated that “Irish, Italians, Poles, Russians, and
Jews all made up distinct and distinctly inferior races that were infecting the superior
gene pool that predated their arrival.” Id.
1
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restrictions were enacted in 1924, it quickly became apparent that
the restrictions could be evaded.3 Once individuals who evaded the
national origin quotas were in the United States, nothing in the
naturalization laws prevented them from becoming United States
citizens.4 Concerns about unauthorized migrants becoming citizens
lead to a new naturalization requirement in 1929.5 Applicants for
naturalization had to demonstrate that they had been lawfully ad-
mitted for permanent residence.6 This naturalization requirement
remains with us today.7 It is the primary barrier to citizenship for
the almost 11 million unauthorized migrants in the United States.8
The continued use of the LPR naturalization requirement is one of
the mechanisms by which U.S. citizenship law is underinclusive.9
American citizenship law inconsistently recognizes the diversity
of ways in which people belong to American society.10 The legal
status of “citizen” is only available to individuals who are born within
the territory of the United States and to other individuals deemed
desirable.11 Desirability within United States citizenship law has
been, and continues to be, a fraught concept.12 Race and ethnicity
have been used as explicit measures of desirability as evidenced by
the racial restrictions in the naturalization laws between 1790 and
1952.13 In addition, low-wage foreign workers have also been, and
continue to be, viewed as undesirable.14 These individuals have been
denied access to citizenship less explicitly, but equally as effectively.15
This reflects a paradox: low-wage foreign workers are critical for the
economic growth and development of American society, yet they are
viewed as a threat to American society and denied consistent access
3. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 95.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 101, 106.
6. See id. at 102, 105.
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a); 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(a)(2) (2020).
8. See Jynnah Radford, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(June 17, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/key-findings-about-u
-s-immigrants [http://perma.cc/YJM3-6JZ7].
9. See Keyes, supra note 1, at 103.
10. See Angela M. Banks, Respectability & the Quest for Citizenship, 83 BROOK. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2017).
11. See Keyes, supra note 1, at 136.
12. See id. at 116, 136, 138.
13. See Banks, supra note 10, at 11, 30.
14. See, e.g., Leticia M. Saucedo, The Impact of 1965 Immigration and Nationality
Act on the Evolution of Temporary Guest Worker Programs, or How the 1965 Act Punted
on Creating a Rightful Place for Mexican Worker Migration, in THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT OF 1965: LEGISLATING A NEW AMERICA 292, 304 (Gabriel J. Chin &
Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2015) (discussing that the Immigration and Naturalization Act
of 1965 “limited the number of immigrant visas available for unskilled manual work”).
15. See id.
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to American citizenship.16 It is this immigrant-labor paradox that
prevents the 11 million unauthorized migrants in the United States
from accessing the legal status of citizen.17
One approach to membership and belonging that expands our
understanding of who belongs in a society is the jus nexi principle.18
This principle focuses on the social fact of membership or the actual
ties that an individual has to a society.19 Within this approach to
belonging, the focus is on an individual’s presence within a commu-
nity, which gives rise to personal relationships and participation
that connect an individual to the society.20 The jus nexi principle has
a long, albeit inconsistent, history in U.S. citizenship law.21 Percep-
tions regarding desirability have shaped who is eligible for citizen-
ship based on the jus nexi principle.22 The jus nexi principle was the
basis for providing a pathway to citizenship for nearly 3 million
unauthorized migrants in the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986.23 However, the pathway created did not alter the general
naturalization rules and is unavailable to the current 11 million
individuals living in the United States as unauthorized migrants.24
This Article begins with an overview of U.S. citizenship law to
illustrate that the legal status of “citizen” is underinclusive because
it fails to recognize the membership of individuals who belong to
U.S. society based on the jus nexi principle. In Part II of the Article,
the ways that race, class, and gender have operated as citizenship
boundaries are analyzed. The use of race, class, and gender to de-
termine who is and is not a de jure member of American society high-
lights the long history of U.S. citizenship law failing to recognize the
social fact of membership and extend citizenship status based on
presence and actual connections. Part III of the Article illustrates how
one of the most significant citizenship boundaries today is rooted in
the national origin quotas of the 1920s. The LPR requirement, which
was adopted to reinforce the national origin quotas, continues to
operate as the most significant barrier to unauthorized migrants’ de
facto membership in American society gaining legal recognition. The
analysis in Part IV of the Article reveals how limiting access to
16. Kitty Calavita, U.S. Immigration Policy: Contradictions and Projections for the
Future, 2 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 143, 145–46 (1994).
17. See Radford, supra note 8.
18. Keyes, supra note 1, at 124.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 127.
21. See id. at 124.
22. See id. at 127.
23. NANCY RYTINA, IRCA LEGALIZATION EFFECTS: LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENCE
AND NATURALIZATION THROUGH 2001 3 (2002).
24. See id.; Radford, supra note 8.
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citizenship, through the LPR requirement, is an explicit strategy to
resolve the immigrant labor paradox. Resolving this paradox re-
quires ensuring employers have access to the low-wage foreign work-
ers they desire while also limiting these workers’ incorporation in
American society because they are viewed by many as an economic,
social, and political threat.
This country’s long-standing response to the immigrant labor
paradox is untenable. As Max Frisch stated in describing the guest
worker programs in Europe after World War II, “we wanted workers,
but people came.”25 Sixty-two percent of unauthorized migrants in
the United States have lived in the country for at least ten years.26
Twenty-one percent have lived in the country for at least twenty
years.27 As a result of this long-term residence, unauthorized mi-
grants have developed strong familial, community, and economic ties
to the United States.28 To deny these individuals access to citizenship
status while depending upon their labor for the country’s economic
growth and development undermines our democracy.
I. THE LEGAL REGULATION OF CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship is a legal status that denotes membership in Ameri-
can society.29 Within citizenship discourse, membership and citizen-
ship are often synonymous, yet there is little exploration of the
possibility of being a member of society without citizenship status.30
To distinguish between these two different conceptions of member-
ship, the concepts of de jure members and de facto members are
useful. De jure members are those individuals who have the formal
legal status that identifies them as members.31 De facto members
are individuals who, based on the facts of their lives—their social,
political, and economic connections to society—are members.32 De
jure membership is extended to certain individuals at birth and others
through the naturalization process.33
25. MAX FRISCH, Schweiz als Heimat?: Versuche über 50 Jahre 219 (Walter Obschlager
ed., 1990) (“[M]an hat Arbeitskräfte gerufen, und es kommen Menschen.”).




28. See, e.g., Keyes, supra note 1, at 109 (discussing DREAMers’ ties to the United
States).
29. See Banks, supra note 10, at 3–4 (exploring that “unauthorized migrants” must
prove their “worth[iness] of full membership in American society”).
30. See id.
31. See De Jure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
32. See De Facto, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
33. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1427.
2020] THE CONTINUING LEGACY OF THE NATIONAL ORIGIN QUOTAS 5
A. Birthright Citizenship
Approximately ninety percent of individuals residing in the
United States are natural-born citizens.34 This means that they have
been U.S. citizens since birth, and they became U.S. citizens based
on either the jus soli principle or the jus sanguinis principle.35 The
jus soli principle extends citizenship to all individuals who are born
within the territory of the United States.36 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution is based on this principle. This
constitutional provision states that “[a]ll persons born or natural-
ized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”37
The jus sanguinis principle grants citizenship based on descent.38
Individuals have access to birthright citizenship if their parents—or
grandparents in some cases—are citizens.39 In the United States,
federal statutory law allows individuals born outside of the United
States to be citizens at birth if at least one of their parents is a U.S.
citizen.40 Birthright citizenship ensures that individuals who are
either born within the State’s territory or have parents who are
citizens of the State will be citizens of that State.41
B. Naturalization
The second pathway to citizenship is naturalization.42 Within
the United States there are 20.7 million naturalized citizens.43
These individuals were born in a non-U.S. territory and did not have
access to jus sanguinis citizenship.44 Federal naturalization law
articulates the requirements for these individuals to become U.S.
citizens.45 United States naturalization law has six basic require-
ments: one must be a lawful permanent resident (LPR) for five years;
reside in the United States continuously for five years; have basic
English language skills, good moral character, knowledge of U.S.
34. See Radford, supra note 8 (stating that immigrants account for 13.6% of the U.S.
population).
35. Keyes, supra note 1, at 136.
36. Id.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. Keyes, supra note 1, at 137.
39. Id.
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g).
41. See id.
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1427.
43. Radford, supra note 8.
44. Keyes, supra note 1, at 136
45. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427, 1423.
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history and civics; and demonstrate attachment to the principles
and ideals of the U.S. Constitution.46
The most significant obstacle to unauthorized migrants being
recognized as de jure members of American society is the LPR require-
ment. Unauthorized migrants are ineligible to naturalize because they
lack lawful permanent residence status.47 Unlike many of the other
naturalization requirements that date back to 1790, the LPR require-
ment was added in 1929 to reinforce the national origin quotas that
were enacted in the 1920s.48 LPRs are commonly referred to as green
card holders, and they are noncitizens who are granted permission
to enter and reside in the United States indefinitely.49 There are two
major pathways to LPR status: family and employment.50 Spouses,
parents, children and siblings of United States citizens are eligible
for LPR status as are the spouses and children of LPRs.51 On the
employment side, noncitizens are eligible for LPR status if they are
professional, executive, skilled workers, or unskilled workers.52 For
both pathways there are often long waits.53 Family-based applicants
have been waiting anywhere from a few months to twenty-five
years.54 For example, in April 2020 the government was still pro-
cessing German citizens with a U.S. citizen sibling who applied for
LPR status in July 2006.55 Mexican citizens who have a U.S. citizen
sibling have been waiting since March 1998.56 Employment-based ap-
plicants typically have shorter wait times; however, current applicants
have been waiting from between a few months to twelve years.57
For unskilled workers, the waits can be quite long as there are
few green cards available for that employment-based category.58 Be-
tween 2010 and 2018, an average of 3,000 noncitizens were admitted
annually as unskilled workers.59 For each of these years, the number
46. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, §§ 312, 316, 66 Stat. 163,
239, 242 (1952).
47. See id.
48. See Registry Act of 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-962, §§ 1, 3, 45 Stat. 1512, 1512–13
(repealed 1940).
49. See Liliana Zaragoza, Delimiting Limitations: Does the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act Impose a Statute of Limitations on Noncitizen Removal Proceedings?, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 1326, 1327 n.1 (2012).
50. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., VISA BULLETIN 2–3 (2020).
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id. at 3.
53. See id. at 2, 4.
54. Id. at 2–3.
55. See id. at 2.
56. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., supra note 50, at 2.
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id. at 3.
59. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,OFF. OF IMMIGR.STATS., 2010YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
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of unskilled workers admitted as LPRs was less than half of one
percent.60 In April 2020, unskilled workers from China who were ad-
mitted to the United States had been waiting since July 2008, those
from India had been waiting since January 2009, and most others
had been waiting since January 2017.61 Thus unskilled workers were
waiting anywhere from three to twelve years to immigrate to the
United States as LPRs.62 Additionally, LPR status for unskilled
workers is only available to noncitizens who are entering the United
States for a permanent—not temporary or seasonal—job and the
employer can demonstrate that there are no available workers in
the United States.63
Noncitizens seeking LPR status not only have to fit within one
of the family-based or employment-based categories, they also have
to be admissible.64 Within the Immigration and Nationality Act there
is a list of factors that can make an individual inadmissible, which
means they will be denied LPR status.65 The inadmissibility grounds
generally address criminal behavior or prior violations of immigra-
tion law.66 However, another important inadmissibility ground is that
the person is likely to become a public charge.67 This inadmissibility
ground dates back to 1882 and it means the person is unable to sup-
port one’s self.68 There are specific factors that the government re-
views to determine if a noncitizen is likely to become a public charge,
and individuals with low incomes are more often found likely to be-
come a public charge.69 This presents an additional challenge for low-
wage, unskilled workers to gain access to United States citizenship.
STATISTICS 22 (2011); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,OFF. OF IMMIGR.STATS., 2011YEARBOOK
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 21(2012);DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,OFF. OF IMMIGR.STATS.,
2012 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 22 (2013); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF.
OF IMMIGR.STATS., 2013YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 22 (2014); DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SEC., OFF. OF IMMIGR. STATS., 2014YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 22 (2016);
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF IMMIGR. STATS., 2015 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STAT-
ISTICS 22 (2016); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF IMMIGR. STATS., 2016 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 22 (2017); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF IMMIGR. STATS.,
2017 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 22 (2019); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF.
OF IMMIGR. STATS., 2018 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 21–22 (2019) [hereinafter
2019 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.].
60. See 2019 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 59, at 5.
61. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., supra note 50, at 4.
62. See id. at 4–5.
63. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, § 212, 66 Stat. 163, 183
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)).
64. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
65. Id. § 1182(a).
66. Id. § 1182(a)(2).
67. Id. § 1182(a)(4).
68. Immigration Act of 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214.
69. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(B)(IV).
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Therefore, socio-economic class is one of the boundaries of de jure
membership in the United States.
II. RACE, CLASS & GENDER AS CITIZENSHIP BOUNDARIES
Race, class, and gender have all been boundaries to United States
citizenship. Historically, racial boundaries were explicit in natural-
ization law and based on the idea that certain racial and ethnic
groups were uninterested and/or unable to adopt mainstream Amer-
ican values, norms, and practices.70 Within the birthright citizen-
ship context, the Supreme Court dictated the racial boundaries of
citizenship through a number of cases in which African Americans,
American Indians, and Asian Americans contested their exclusion
from de jure membership.71
Before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the jus soli prin-
ciple generally governed birthright citizenship in the United States.72
In 1857, the United States Supreme Court held that the jus soli com-
mon law principle did not apply to African Americans.73 Dred Scott,
an enslaved person, sued for his freedom in federal court.74 The federal
court only had jurisdiction over cases involving citizens of different
states.75 John Sandford, the person who owned Mr. Scott, argued that
Mr. Scott could not sue in federal court because he was not a citizen
of the United States or of any state within the United States.76 The
Court stated that the question it had to decide was as follows:
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country,
and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community
formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the
United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and
privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the
citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of
the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution.77
70. See Naturalization Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103–04 (estab-
lishing naturalization for “free white person[s]”) (repealed 1795); see, e.g., Lucy E. Salyer,
Baptism by Fire: Race, Military Service, and U.S. Citizenship Policy, 1918–1935, 91 J.
AM. HIST. 847, 848 (2004) (“Such determinations often rested on the presumption that
Asians . . . would not, and could not, assimilate.”).
71. See JAMES H.KETTNER, THEDEVELOPMENT OF AMERICANCITIZENSHIP,1608–1870
296–97 n.32 (1978); see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898);
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1857), superseded by constitutional amend-
ment, U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
72. KETTNER, supra note 71, at 342–43.
73. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404–05.
74. Id. at 396.
75. Id. at 400–02.
76. Id. at 400.
77. Id. at 403. The Court specified that it was only considering the citizenship status
of people. Id. (“[T]he plea applies to that class of persons only whose ancestors were
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The Court concluded that African Americans could not become de
jure members of American society.78 Focusing on the founding of the
United States, the Court concluded that African Americans “were
not intended” to be citizens of the United States because
they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior
class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race,
and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their
authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who
held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.79
The Civil War brought an end to slavery in the United States and
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment codified in the U.S. Con-
stitution that African Americans would be de jure members of
American society.80
While the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution clarified African Americans’ access to de jure membership, its
application to American Indians and the children of Asian immi-
grants was not straightforward. The Supreme Court had to intervene
to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment applied to each
of these groups.81 The assumptions about birth within the territory
and socialization to dominant national values, norms, and practices
were questioned for those who were not African American or of Euro-
pean descent.82 In 1884, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not grant birthright citizenship to American Indi-
ans.83 The Court explained that American Indians were not “subject
to the jurisdiction” of the United States because of their affiliation
with tribal nations, which have been described as “separate, self-
governing political communities whose sovereignty predated the
Constitution.”84 The Court explained that American Indians
negroes of the African race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves.
The only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is, whether the descendants of such
slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had become free
before their birth, are citizens of a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is used
in the Constitution of the United States.”).
78. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 451–52.
79. Id. at 404–05.
80. See KETTNER, supra note 71, at 342–43, 345 n.31.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653 (1898); Elk v. Wilkins,
112 U.S. 94, 101(1884).
82. Elk, 112 U.S. at 101 (“The main object of the opening sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to settle the question, upon which there had been a difference of opinion
throughout the country and in this court, as to the citizenship of free negroes . . . and to put
it beyond doubt that all persons, white or black, and whether formerly slaves or not, born
or naturalized in the United States, and owing no allegiance to any alien power, should be
citizens of the United States and of the State in which they reside.”) (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 109.
84. Societal and Legal Issues Surrounding Children Born in the United States to
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are no more “born in the United States and subject to the juris-
diction thereof,” within the meaning of the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, than the children of subjects of any
foreign government born within the domain of that government,
or the children born within the United States, of ambassadors or
other public ministers of foreign nations.85
This ruling was made despite the fact that the petitioner in the case,
John Elk, had “severed his tribal relation to the Indian tribes.”86
Relying on a theoretical conception of Indian sovereignty, the Court
failed to recognize American Indians as individuals entitled to Con-
stitutional birthright citizenship.87 It was not until 1925, when Con-
gress passed the Indian Citizenship Act, that all American Indians
would be recognized as United States citizens at birth.88
In 1898, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the children of
Chinese immigrants born in the United States were birthright
citizens pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.89 Wong Kim Ark
was born in San Francisco and his parents were Chinese citizens.90
He traveled to China and upon his return to the United States in
1895 he was denied admission.91 The government argued that Wong
Kim Ark “has been at all times, by reason of his race, language, color
and dress, a Chinese person, and now is, and for some time last past
has been, a laborer by occupation” so he was not admissible pursuant
to the Chinese Exclusion Act.92 The Chinese Exclusion Act barred
the entry of Chinese nationals who were laborers.93 The Court
rejected the government’s argument explaining that the Fourteenth
Amendment used the phrase “all persons,” which is universal.94 The
only restriction is jurisdictional, rather than on the basis of race or
color.95 The Court was concerned that the government’s position in
this case could lead to the denial of citizenship for the children of
the “thousands of English, Scotch, Irish, German, or other European”
Illegal Alien Parents: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims
and the Subcomm. on the Const. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 105–09
(1995) (statement of Prof. Gerald Neuman, Columbia University Law School).
85. Elk, 112 U.S. at 102.
86. Id. at 98.
87. See id. at 109.
88. Citizenship to Indians Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253, 253 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)) (declaring “all non-citizen Indians born within the ter-
ritorial limits of the United States” to be citizens).
89. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898).
90. Id. at 649.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 650.
93. Id. at 653.
94. Id. at 654.
95. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 654.
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immigrants.96 These children “have always been considered and
treated as citizens of the United States.”97 The Court decided not to
distinguish between the children of European immigrants and those
of Asian immigrants, and held that Wong Kim Ark was a U.S. citizen
based on the Fourteenth Amendment.98 This was not a unanimous
decision—Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan issued a dissent-
ing opinion.99 Historian Lucy Salyer explains that “Harlan saw the
Chinese as fundamentally different, in terms of their racial and
cultural identities and their ability to be part of America’s unique re-
publican experience.”100 She concludes that neither Chief Justice
Fuller nor Justice Harlan “believed that the American law of citizen-
ship should be read to make citizens of individuals who, in their opin-
ion, would never be able to develop a true allegiance to the country.”101
Concerns about cultural assimilation also shaped the natural-
ization rules enacted by Congress.102 Between 1790 and 1952, there
were racial requirements for naturalization.103 The first naturaliza-
tion law only allowed “free white person[s]” to naturalize.104 This
racial requirement was expanded to include individuals of “African
nativity” or “persons of African descent” after the Civil War and
African Americans gained birthright citizenship pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment.105 The legislative history of the 1870 Natu-
ralization Act is rather instructive regarding the role of race as a
proxy for values and norms that were desirable in future citizens.106
Senator Sumner of Massachusetts offered an amendment to the
proposed naturalization reforms that would have eliminated the
racial requirements.107 While there was little objection to making
immigrants of African descent eligible for naturalization, there were
strong objections to making Chinese immigrants eligible for natural-
ization.108 Members of Congress expressed grave concerns about the
96. Id. at 694.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 694, 705.
99. See id. at 705–32 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
100. Lucy E. Salyer, Wong Kim Ark: The Contest Over Birthright Citizenship, in
IMMIGRATION STORIES 51, 76 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
101. Id. at 76.
102. See id. at 57 (“Not only would [Chinese immigrants] remain strangers to American
ideas and culture, but nativists argued, they also posed a distinct threat to the country’s
republican principles and institutions. Americans, the inheritors of the ‘Anglo-Saxon
civilization,’ loved freedom . . . .”).
103. See id. at 53.
104. Naturalization Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103–04 (repealed 1795).
105. Naturalization Act of 1870, Pub. L. No 41-254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256.
106. For a comprehensive review of the legislative history of the Naturalization Act
of 1870, see Banks, supra note 10, at 11–18.
107. Id. at 11.
108. Id. at 14.
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values, norms, and practices of Chinese immigrants.109 While there
were counter-narratives offered portraying Chinese immigrants as
Christian, law-abiding, and hardworking people, the narrative that
presented Chinese immigrants as a threat to mainstream American
values, norms, and practices dominated.110 Chinese immigrants re-
mained ineligible for citizenship until 1943 when Congress repealed
the Chinese Exclusion Act and made Chinese immigrants eligible
for naturalization.111 The exclusion of Asian immigrants from natu-
ralization was based on the idea that no matter how much time
Asian immigrants spent in the United States, they were unassimil-
able because they would neither adopt nor commit to mainstream
American values, norms, and practices.112
Congressional concerns about married women’s commitment to
American values, norms, and practice also shaped the federal laws
governing citizenship.113 Between 1907 and 1931, American women
were stripped of their U.S. citizenship if they married a noncitizen.114
Coverture, a governing theory in the early twentieth century, dictated
that married women did not have an independent legal existence.115
Married women were subsumed under their husbands’ legal identi-
ties and were treated as their husbands’ dependents.116 The 1907
Expatriation Act stated that a U.S. citizen woman who married a
noncitizen man would take the husband’s citizenship.117 If the hus-
band’s country of citizenship did not provide a basis for the wife to
obtain citizenship, she became stateless.118 The former American
citizen wife could naturalize to regain her U.S. citizenship, but only
if her husband naturalized first.119 This law was modified in 1922
109. Id. at 12–14.
110. Id. at 12.
111. Act of Dec. 17, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-199, 57 Stat. 600 (repealing the Chinese
Exclusion Act).
112. NGAI, supra note 2, at 8 (“The legal racialization of these ethnic groups’ national
origin cast them as permanently foreign and unassimilable to the nation.”); Banks, supra
note 10, at 39–44 (“Concerns about social unrest were most often expressed as concerns
about the inability of Chinese immigrants to assimilate.”); Salyer, supra note 70, at 848
(“Such determinations often rested on the presumption that Asians would remain always
‘yellow at heart,’ that they would not, and could not, assimilate.”).
113. See Banks, supra note 10, at 18–19.
114. Expatriation Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-193, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228–29 (re-
pealed 1922).
115. See Felice Batlan, “She Was Surprised and Furious”: Expatriation, Suffrage,
Immigration, and the Fragility of Women’s Citizenship, 1907–1940, 15 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 315, 317–18 (2020).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 319–20.
118. Id. at 321.
119. See Citizenship of Married Women (Cable) Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-346, §§ 2,
4, 42 Stat. 1021, 1021–22 (amended 1930).
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with the enactment of the Cable Act of 1922.120 This Act allowed a
U.S. citizen woman to retain her citizenship if she married an alien
who was “eligible for citizenship.”121 In 1922, only white immigrants
and immigrants of African nativity or African descent were eligible
to naturalize.122 Therefore, U.S. citizen women married to non-white
and non-black immigrants continued to lose their citizenship upon
marriage.123 It was not until 1931 when the Naturalization Act of
1906 was amended that U.S. citizen women could marry any nonciti-
zen without losing their American citizenship.124 The legal rules
depriving U.S. citizen women of their citizenship upon marriage to
a noncitizen were rooted in the idea that, due to coverture, a married
woman could not have a legal identity, and therefore a citizenship,
that differed from that of her husband.125 Regardless of whether a
woman was born in the United States or if she resided there long-
term, her citizenship status was based on her husband’s status.126
The boundaries of U.S. citizenship have been shaped by race,
class, and gender, each of which has been used as a proxy for desir-
ability. Legal rules have been instrumental in creating or reinforc-
ing the boundaries of belonging. Courts have interpreted legal rules
in ways that denied individuals access to citizenship based on race,
and legislatures have enacted laws that explicitly prohibited certain
groups from being eligible for citizenship.127 By the 1920s, hostility
toward Southern and Eastern European immigrants could not be
ignored by Congress.128 Yet these immigrants were white and could
not be denied access to de jure membership based on existing law.129
This led Congress to utilize the same strategy it had used to limit
120. See Batlan, supra note 115, at 324–26.
121. Cable Act of 1922, § 4.
122. See Banks, supra note 10, at 14.
123. See Naturalization Act of 1870, Pub. L. No. 41-254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (“And
be it further enacted, [t]hat the naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of
African nativity and to persons of African descent.”); see also Citizenship of Married
Women (Cable) Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-346, § 3, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022 (amended 1930)
(“Provided, That any woman citizen who marries an alien ineligible to citizenship shall
cease to be a citizen of the United States.”); Batlan, supra note 115, at 325–26.
124. See Act of July 3, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-508, §§ 1, 4, 46 Stat. 854, 854 (amending
the Cable Act of 1922).
125. See Batlan, supra note 115, at 317–18.
126. See id. at 319–20.
127. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 10, at 21 (illustrating the Court’s upholding of
Congress’s constitutional authority to prohibit immigration based on race in the case of
the Chinese Exclusion laws).
128. See Julia Young, Making America 1920 Again? Nativism and U.S. Immigration,
Past and Present, 5 J. MIGRATION AND HUM. SEC. 217, 221–23 (2017).
129. Id. at 223 (“Prior to World War I, legislation did not explicitly restrict the selection
or composition of immigrants based on race or nationality, with the exception of Asian
immigrants.”).
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Chinese migration in the late 1800s—immigration restriction.130 In
an effort to reinforce the national origin quotas that were adopted
in the 1920s, Congress also revised the naturalization rules to require
lawful admission for permanent residence.131 This new LPR require-
ment would limit the ability of migrants deemed undesirable to
become de jure members of American society.132
III. A CONTINUING LEGACY OF THE NATIONAL ORIGIN QUOTAS
The LPR naturalization requirement continues to operate as a
significant barrier to de jure membership in the United States.133
Though the requirement began as a response to undesirable Southern
and Eastern European migration, it continues to limit low-wage for-
eign workers’ ability to obtain the legal status of citizen.134 The effect
of those limitations is reminiscent of the national origin quotas.135
National origin quotas were first adopted in 1921 in order to limit the
number of immigrants from Southern and Eastern European.136 This
was a temporary quota regime that was made permanent three years
later with the enactment of the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of
1924.137 This act was the first comprehensive immigration restric-
tion law that was based on “a global racial and national hierarchy that
favored some immigrants over others.”138 The 1924 law limited mi-
gration from the Eastern Hemisphere to 155,000 individuals per year
and established per country quotas whereby the number of individuals
allowed to migrate from each country was “2 percent of the foreign-
born population” in the United States in 1890 from that country.139
130. See Emergency Quota Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, § 2, 42 Stat. 5, 5–6 (limiting
immigration based on census percentages); Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139,
§ 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159.
131. See Registry Act of 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-962, §§ 1, 3, 45 Stat. 1512, 1512–13
(repealed 1940).
132. See Keyes, supra note 1, at 138–39.
133. See, e.g., id. at 140.
134. NGAI, supra note 2, at 238.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 21 (“The law set the quotas according to the 1910 census because data from
the 1920 census was not fully compiled at the time. Using 1910 as the base, the southern
and eastern European countries received 45 percent of the quotas and the northern and
western European countries received 55 percent. Although the quotas reduced southern
and eastern European immigration by 20 percent from prewar levels, nativists believed
it was still unacceptably high. They argued for a 2 percent quota based on the 1890
census. That was when, they argued, the sources of European immigration shifted,
altering the racial homogeneity of the nation. The 1890 formula reduced the level of
immigration to 155,000 per year and reduced the proportion of southern and eastern
European immigration to a mere 15 percent of the total.”).
137. See NGAI, supra note 2, at 3.
138. Id. at 3.
139. Id. at 22–23.
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This quota regime was the culmination of agitation from two broad
camps. First, American labor interest groups were concerned that
immigrant laborers were lowering wages and working conditions.140
Second, supporters of the eugenics movement believed that South-
ern and Eastern European immigrants were racially inferior.141 The
quotas that were enacted “served contemporary prejudices among
white Protestant Americans from northern European backgrounds
and their desire to maintain social and political dominance.”142
With the enactment of such drastic immigration restrictions,
individuals who were inadmissible due to the quotas began to find
ways to evade the quotas and become United States citizens.143 For
example, European migrants would enlist in Canadian agricultural
labor programs and—shortly after arriving in Canada—seek entry
into the United States.144 Additionally, European immigrants en-
tered the United States through Mexico.145 In 1924, Walter Elcarr, the
Commissioner General of Immigration, explained that “[l]ong estab-
lished routes from southern Europe to Mexican ports and overland
to the Texas border, formerly patronized almost exclusively by dis-
eased and criminal aliens, are now resorted to by large numbers of
Europeans who cannot gain legal admission because of passport dif-
ficulties, illiteracy, or the quota law.”146 Once these individuals had
entered the United States, they were able to naturalize and become
citizens.147 At that time, a noncitizen had to satisfy residence and
character requirements, be “attached to the principles of the Consti-
tution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and
140. KITTY CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF LABOR, 1820–1924
139–41 (1984).
141. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 91–92 (“Irish, Italians, Russians, Polish, and many
other Europeans were referred to as ‘contagions’ that could infect the good stock of
Americans tracing their lineage to countries like England.”).
142. NGAI, supra note 2, at 23.
143. See id. at 66.
144. Id. (“An investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1925 reported
that ‘thousands’ of immigrants, ‘mostly late arrivals from Europe,’ were ‘coming [into
Canada] as fast as they can get the money to pay the smugglers.’”).
145. Id.
146. Id. By the late 1920s it was no longer necessary for European migrants who were
inadmissible due to the national origin quotas to enter without authorization through
Canada or Mexico. Id. Alternative legal routes existed for them to enter the United
States. NGAI, supra note 2, at 66. For example, Europeans who resided in Canada for
five years could be lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States. Id.
Additionally, as Southern and Eastern European migrants became naturalized citizens
they were able to sponsor relatives who would not be subject to the national origin
quotas. Id. Historian Mae Ngai notes that in 1927 over half of the nonquota immigrants
were from Italy with Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Greek immigrants being the next
largest groups of nonquota immigrants. Id. at 66–67.
147. See id. (“Europeans could go to Canada and be admitted to United States legally
after they had resided in Canada for five years.”).
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happiness of the United States,” file a declaration of intention two
years prior to naturalizing, speak English, and provide a certificate
from the Department of Commerce or the Department of Labor stating
the date, place, and manner of their arrival in the United States.148
The last requirement was adopted in 1906 as a way to support appli-
cants’ claims that they satisfied the residence requirement.149 Whether
a noncitizen was admitted for a vacation or with the intent to reside
permanently was of little importance in 1906, but it became criti-
cally important with the introduction of the national origin quotas.150
Despite the creation of the certificate of arrival requirement in
1906, it was not a significant barrier to naturalization until 1921.151
While Congress wanted the government to provide certificates that
would evidence noncitizens’ arrival in the United States, such cer-
tificates were not routinely issued until 1911.152 Between 1921 and
1925 it was the practice of the Bureau of Naturalization to authorize
the issuance of a certificate of arrival to individuals who were seek-
ing naturalization but did not have a record of their arrival.153 If the
noncitizen made a statement under oath regarding their entry into
the United States, a certificate of arrival was issued.154 After the
adoption of the temporary national origin quota system in 1921, the
Bureau of Naturalization became concerned that it could end up
granting certificates of arrival to individuals who had evaded the na-
tional origin quotas.155 The practice of issuing certificates of arrival
based on a statement under oath ended, but to help shape their future
practices, the Bureau sought legislative reform to address the variety
of reasons that noncitizens lacked a certificate of arrival.156
In 1928, Congress held hearings exploring amendments to the
national origin quota system.157 There was a lot of discussion about
148. Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 4, 34 Stat. 596,
598 (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1427).
149. See Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1906 § 4.
150. See NGAI, supra note 2, at 22–23 (the quota “restricted immigration to 155,000
a year, established temporary quotas based on 2 percent of the foreign-born population
in 1890, and mandated the secretaries of labor, state, and commerce to determine quotas
on the basis of national origins by 1927. The law also excluded from immigration all
persons ineligible to citizenship, a euphemism for Japanese exclusion.”).
151. BUREAU OF NATURALIZATION,ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF NATURALI-
ZATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 9–10 (1927).
152. Amendments to Immigration Act of 1924: Nonquota and Preference Provisions—
Certificates of Arrival—Nurses and Teachers in Porto Rico: Hearings Before the H.
Comm. on Immigr. & Naturalization, 70th Cong. 88 (1928) [hereinafter Amendments to
the 1924 Immigration Act Hearings].
153. See BUREAU OF NATURALIZATION, supra note 151, at 10.
154. Amendments to the 1924 Immigration Act Hearings, supra note 152, at 89–90.
155. See id. at 88–89.
156. See id. at 88–90.
157. See id. at 1.
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the need for some sort of process to grant certificates of arrival for non-
citizens who did not obtain them at the time of their entry.158 The
discussion often turned to the reason why noncitizens were not issued
a certificate of arrival.159 Representative Hays B. White from Kansas
explained that the officers at ports of entry did not routinely issue
certificates of arrival until 1911.160 Nevertheless, members of Con-
gress expressed concern that the reason individuals lacked the certi-
ficate was that they had entered in a manner that evaded the national
origin quotas and therefore should not obtain the certificate.161
Congress heeded the suggestion from the Bureau of Naturaliza-
tion by adopting a registry program in 1929, and went a step further
in introducing a new naturalization requirement.162 The registry pro-
gram empowered the Commissioner General of Immigration to issue
a certificate of arrival to individuals who could demonstrate that
they (1) had entered the United States before June 3, 1921; (2) had
resided in the United States continuously since their entry; (3) had
good moral character; and (4) were not subject to deportation.163
Additionally, applicants had to pay a twenty-dollar fee.164 A certificate
issued under this process would satisfy the naturalization require-
ments.165 However, this Act also created a new naturalization re-
quirement.166 In addition to having to produce “a certificate showing
the date, place, and manner of his arrival,” applicants for natural-
ization also had to establish their “lawful entry for permanent resi-
dence.”167 The LPR naturalization requirement was adopted to ensure
that individuals who evaded the national origin quotas would not be
able to naturalize.168 In 1926 the main obstacle for individuals inter-
ested in long-term residence in the United States was the national
origin quota system.169
158. See id. at 86–90, 99.
159. See id. at 88–90.
160. Amendments to the 1924 Immigration Act Hearings, supra note 152, at 88.
161. See id. at 89.
162. See Registry Act of 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-962, §§ 1–3, 45 Stat. 1512, 1512–13
(repealed 1940).
163. Id. § 1.
164. Id.
165. Id. § 3.
166. See id. § 4.
167. Id.
168. See Registry Act of 1929 § 4.
169. See NGAI, supra note 2, at 22–23. Connecting immigration admission restrictions
and limiting access to naturalization was not new in 1929. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion
Act, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882). That relationship was made when the first
large-scale federal immigration restrictions were adopted in 1882. See id. The Chinese
Exclusion Act prohibited the entry of Chinese laborers, and it made Chinese immigrants
ineligible for naturalization. Id. § 1. The prohibition on Chinese immigrant naturalization
was a bit superfluous since the federal naturalization law only allowed white persons
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National origin quotas were repealed in 1965, yet the LPR natu-
ralization requirement remains.170 It remains because restrictions
continue to be a part of U.S. immigration law.171 While the current
immigration restriction regime was enacted to disavow the use of
immigration law to shape the racial and ethnic demographics of the
United States, restrictions continue to exist.172 Today numerical
restrictions are applied equally to all countries in the world and
substantive restrictions limit access to LPR status based on family
relationships and employment skills and opportunities.173 The LPR
requirement—a tool that was introduced into American citizenship
law to reinforce white supremacy—continues to operate as a barrier
to de jure membership. In particular, today that barrier limits low-
wage foreign workers access to citizenship.174 As long as admission
restrictions exist, the LPR naturalization requirement will continue
to ensure that individuals who circumvent the restrictions are unable
to become de jure members of American society.
IV. RESOLVING THE IMMIGRANT LABOR PARADOX
Since the founding of the United States of America, a paradox
has existed regarding noncitizen labor. Immigrant workers have
been critical to the economic growth and development of American
society, yet they have been perceived as economic, social, and politi-
cal threats to American society.175 Audre Lorde captured this broad
perspective when she wrote, “[i]n a society where the good is defined
in terms of profit rather than in terms of human need, there must
always be some group of people who, through systematized oppres-
sion, can be made to feel surplus, to occupy the place of the dehu-
manized inferior.”176 Immigration and citizenship law has responded
and persons of African nativity and African descent to naturalize. Naturalization Act of
1870, Pub. L. No 41-254, §§ 1–4, 16 Stat. 254, 254–55. Prohibiting Chinese immigrant
naturalization served two goals. First, it ensured that any Chinese laborers who evaded
the Chinese Exclusion Act would be unable to become de jure members of American
society. See NGAI, supra note 2, at 37–50. Second, it ensured that Chinese immigrants,
who were viewed as culturally undesirable, would be unable to become de jure members
of American society. Id.
170. See Immigration Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911, 911–12
(codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1152); 8 U.S.C. § 1429.
171. 8 U.S.C. § 1429.
172. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153.
173. Id.
174. See id. § 1153(b).
175. CALAVITA, supra note 140, at 138–41; LEO CHAVEZ, THE LATINO THREAT: CON-
STRUCTING IMMIGRANTS, CITIZENS, AND THE NATION 23–47 (2013).
176. AUDRELORDE, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER
OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 114–15 (1984).
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to this paradox by granting employers access to their desired work-
ers, but doing so in a way that requires the workers to remain on
the periphery of society without a pathway to de jure membership.
The primary strategies for achieving this equilibrium are temporary
worker programs and limited immigration enforcement.177
A. Access to Workers
The growth and development of the United States has depended
on the work of foreign workers who earn low wages and work in chal-
lenging environments. This can be seen from enslaved people of Afri-
can descent doing agricultural, domestic, and skilled labor in the
American South,178 to Chinese laborers building the transcontinental
railroad,179 to Mexican laborers staffing the agricultural expansion
in the American Southwest.180 The desirability of foreign workers
was, and remains, based on their willingness to work for wages and
in conditions that enable employers to maximize profits.181 During the
nineteenth century there were significant, and often violent, clashes
over the immigrant labor paradox.182 Uprisings by, and on behalf of,
American citizen workers led to the enactment of the Chinese Exclu-
sion Act in 1882 and the Alien Contract Labor Law in 1885, also
known as the Foran Act.183 These laws prohibited certain immigrants
from being able to enter the United States—Chinese laborers and
unskilled contract laborers, respectively.184 The list of prohibited
177. See infra notes 187–277 and accompanying text.
178. See Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 AM. U.
L. REV. 191, 239 (2003).
179. RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN
AMERICANS 6 (1998).
180. DAVID GUTIÉRREZ, WALLS AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN AMERICANS, MEXICAN IMMI-
GRANTS, AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 39–42 (1995).
181. Legal scholars Jennifer Gordon and R.A. Lenhardt explain that one reason for
this is that recent immigrant workers use different yardsticks to measure the value of
their work than long-term resident foreign workers and citizen workers. Jennifer Gordon
& R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L.REV.1161, 1220 (2008).
For example, for newer immigrants “the yardstick is global and, at least initially, short-
term.” Id. Low wages and challenging work conditions allow new immigrants to “provide
meaningful financial support and some tangible advancement” to family in their home
country. Id. Long-term resident immigrants and citizen workers use a yardstick that is
comparatively local and long term. Id. at 1221. For these workers the money earned
must support life in the United States and low wages do not provide an opportunity for
upward mobility. Id. at 1221–22.
182. CALAVITA, supra note 140, at 27.
183. See id. at 39–59 (exploring American laborers unrest, and the state’s response,
in the late nineteenth century).
184. See Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L. No. 47-126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58, 59 (1882); Alien
Contract Labor Law, Pub. L. No. 48-164, §§ 1–2, 23 Stat. 332, 332–33 (1885) (prohibiting
employers from paying the transportation costs of foreign workers or otherwise
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immigrants expanded in 1917, and additional requirements were
implemented to deter immigrants deemed undesirable.185 For exam-
ple, the 1917 Immigration Act created a head tax for all immigrants
and literacy requirements for admission.186 Additionally, the prohi-
bition on contract laborers was broadened compared to its 1885
Foran Act predecessor.187 The adoption of more stringent admissions
requirements made it increasingly difficult for low-wage foreign
workers to gain admission to the United States, which satisfied the
goals of American labor and other restrictionists. However, it left
employers in agriculture, mining, construction, and manufacturing
without the workers they desired.188 The response to employers’
concerns has been temporary worker programs and limited immi-
gration enforcement.189
1. Temporary Worker Programs
With the United States in the midst of World War I, employers in
industries reliant upon low-wage foreign labor successfully lobbied
Congress for a temporary worker program.190 In addition to the re-
strictions included in the 1917 Immigration Act, there was a provision
that gave the Commissioner General of Immigration the authority
to issue rules that would allow for the admission of noncitizens who
were otherwise inadmissible if the individuals were seeking temporary
admission.191 Based on this authority, regulations were enacted that
allowed Mexican migrants to enter the United States as temporary
workers.192 Approximately 80,000 Mexican migrants were admitted
to work in agriculture and for the railroad companies.193 The use of
encourage migration as part of a contract to work in the United States that was executed
before migrating to the United States).
185. See Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, §§ 2–3, 39 Stat. 874, 875–78.
186. See id. §§ 2, 3.
187. The Immigration Act of 1917 excluded all foreign workers who had “been induced,
assisted, encouraged, or solicited to migrate to this country by offers or promises of
employment, whether such offers or promises are true or false, or in consequence of
agreements, oral, written or printed, express or implied, to perform labor in this country
of any kind, skilled or unskilled.” Id. § 3. Compare with the broader limitations of the
Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
188. GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 180, at 52; MARK REISLER, BY THE SWEAT OF THEIR BROW:
MEXICAN IMMIGRANT LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900–1940 58–59 (1976).
189. See, e.g., Saucedo, supra note 14, at 294–96.
190. DAVID E. LOREY, THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 69–71 (1999).
191. Immigration Act of 1917, § 39 Stat. at 878 (the Commissioner General of Immigra-
tion was authorized “to control and regulate the admission and return of otherwise
inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission”).
192. Saucedo, supra note 14, at 294.
193. Id.
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these exceptions ended in 1921 in response to pressure from the
American Federation of Labor.194
Employers viewed the World War I Mexican temporary worker
program as a success, and it became one strategy for responding to
the immigrant worker paradox.195 It would be another twenty-one
years before a formal temporary worker program was adopted in the
United States, but the value of temporary foreign workers shaped
the Immigration Act of 1924 that created the permanent national
origin quota system.196 As this legislation was being discussed in
Congress during the early 1920s, employers testified that the immi-
grant labor shortage that would be caused by the new restrictions
could be mitigated.197 The mitigation was discussed in terms of new
labor sources—African Americans and Mexican migrants.198 Mexican
workers were viewed as a desirable replacement because they were
considered temporary workers.199 There were two reasons for the
presumption of temporariness.200 First, due to the proximity of the
United States and Mexico, Mexican workers could engage in circular
migration—migrate to the United States for seasonal work and then
return to Mexico until the next opportunity for seasonal work.201 The
possibility of seasonal temporary migration was hailed as an improve-
ment over the use of Asian and European immigrant laborers.202
Second, Mexican migrants could be viewed as temporary because it
was easier for the government to remove them when it was politically
or economically desirable.203 This desire for access to temporary for-
eign workers lead Congress to exempt the Western Hemisphere
from the national origin quotas.204 Individuals from this region were
classified as “non-quota immigrants” and were only subject to quali-
tative immigration restrictions.205 Consequently, Mexican workers
194. Id.
195. Id. at 294–95.
196. See NGAI, supra note 2, at 22–23.
197. Prohibition of Immigration: Hearing on H.R. 13325, 13669, 13904, and 14577
Before the H. Comm. On Immigr. & Naturalization, 65th Cong. 24–25 (1919) [hereinafter
1919 House Hearings]. Eastern and Southern European migrants had been a major
source of low-wage foreign workers. See, e.g., GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 180, at 52. With the
enactment of the national origin quotas employers were concerned that they would be
unable to meet their labor demands. Id.
198. 1919 House Hearings, supra note 197; CALAVITA, supra note 140, at 160.
199. 1919 House Hearings, supra note 197.
200. Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and
Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921–1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 88–89 (2003).
201. Id.
202. NGAI, supra note 2, at 70–71.
203. 1919 House Hearings, supra note 197.
204. See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 4, 43 Stat. 153, 155.
205. Id. Qualitative restrictions included rules regarding being a public charge or the
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were able to enter the United States as immigrants, but the qualita-
tive restrictions could be used to reduce admission during times of
economic downturns or when politically expedient.206
In practice the qualitative restrictions and required fees imposed
a significant burden on Mexican migration after the Immigration
Act of 1924.207 Mexican citizens interested in migrating to the United
States had to pass the literacy test, obtain a visa from an American
consulate in Mexico, which cost ten dollars, and pay an eight-dollar
head tax.208 The literacy test was due to the prohibition on the entry
of noncitizens “over sixteen years of age, physically capable of read-
ing, who cannot read the English language, or some other language
or dialect, including Hebrew or Yiddish.”209 Literacy was evaluated
by requiring individuals to read thirty to forty words in the lan-
guage or dialect of their choice.210 Not only were these fees prohibi-
tive for many migrants seeking jobs in the United States that paid
low wages, but there were expenses involved in obtaining the re-
quired visa.211 Individuals had to travel to a consulate to apply for
a visa and spend a few days in a hotel waiting to obtain the visa.212
Consequently, thousands of Mexican citizens entered the United
States without authorization “[r]ather than abandon their hopes of
requirement of a head tax. See, e.g., CALAVITA, supra note 140, at 160 (discussing that
after the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1924 “[c]onsuls abroad were told to utilize
the old ‘likely to become a public charge’ clause during depressions in order to reject
applications for visas”).
206. CALAVITA, supra note 140, at 160. This theoretical possibility became a reality
when the Great Depression reduced employers’ need for workers. See GUTIÉRREZ, supra
note 180, at 72–73. Between 1929 and 1937 Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans
were forcibly removed en masse in a program known as Mexican Repatriation. Id. at 72.
The name is a bit of a misnomer given that many of the individuals that moved to Mexico
were United States citizens and thus not being repatriated. Id. On average 80,000
individuals of Mexican descent were removed to Mexico; however, a lot of data from that
time period regarding the ethnic Mexican population in the United States are unreliable.
Id. Consequently, scholars estimate that anywhere from 350,000 to 600,000 Mexican
migrants and Mexican Americans left the United States and went to Mexico. Id. The
individuals who were removed to Mexico during this time period were “not formally
deported.” Id. Deportation is a “cumbersome and time-consuming administrative proce-
dure.” GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 180, at 72. Rather, officials from “the U.S. Department of
Labor and the Border Patrol, local welfare agencies, and other government bodies en-
couraged Mexican aliens to depart voluntarily” and the Mexican government encouraged
its nationals to return by offering subsidized transportation costs “and, in some cases,
to resettle repatriates on government-sponsored agricultural tracts.” Id. at 72–73. Despite
the “voluntariness” of the movement to Mexico, for most people who left, it “was a trau-
matic, disorienting, and sorrowful course undertaken under extreme duress.” Id. at 73.
207. NGAI, supra note 2, at 67.
208. REISLER, supra note 188, at 59.
209. Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 877.
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211. See REISLER, supra note 188, at 59.
212. MANUEL GAMIO, MEXICAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF
HUMAN MIGRATION AND ADJUSTMENT 204–05 (1930).
2020] THE CONTINUING LEGACY OF THE NATIONAL ORIGIN QUOTAS 23
finding jobs in the United States.”213 As will be addressed below,
limited enforcement of immigration law became another response
to the immigrant labor paradox.214
With World War II came new labor shortages that gave rise to
a new temporary worker program—the Bracero Program.215 This
program operated between 1942 and 1964.216 The program’s struc-
ture changed several times over the course of the program, but the
basic premise of ensuring agricultural employers had continued
access to Mexican farm workers remained.217 During the program’s
operation an average of 200,000 workers came annually to work on
farms throughout the Southwest and a total of 4.5 million Mexican
workers came over the course of the program.218 At various times
there was pressure to end the program, but it persisted based on
claims from growers that there were insufficient U.S. workers avail-
able to do the work.219 In 1961 the program received its last extension
and began a four-year wind down.220
The turn to temporary immigrant labor provided a solution to
the immigrant labor paradox. Employers would continue to have
access to immigrant workers that allowed profit maximization, but
the migrants would be temporary. The workers’ admission as non-
immigrants made them ineligible for naturalization and their non-
immigrant admission was contingent on the needs of employers and
the economy more broadly.221 Thus, if employers determined their
need for workers diminished, the temporary immigrant workers
could be required to leave the country.222
The immigration restrictions that Congress enacted in the late
1800s and early 1920s significantly limited the ability of individuals
to migrate to the United States as laborers and become de jure mem-
bers of American society.223 Large numbers of potential immigrants
were prohibited from entering the United States.224 The small num-
ber of immigrants allowed each year was thought to be insufficient
213. REISLER, supra note 188, at 59.
214. Saucedo, supra note 14, at 295–96.
215. Id. at 296.
216. Id. at 295, 299.
217. Id. at 294–96.
218. Id. at 296; see also KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM,
IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. 55 (1992).
219. Saucedo, supra note 14, at 296–97.
220. Id. at 301–02.
221. Id. at 293
222. See id.
223. See Douglas S. Massey & Karen A. Pren, Unintended Consequences of US Im-
migration Policy: Explaining the Post-1965 Surge from Latin America, 38 POPULATION
DEV. REV. 1, 1 (2012).
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to meet the labor demands of the agricultural, mining, construction,
and manufacturing industries.225 The introduction of the LPR natu-
ralization requirement in 1929 meant that the turn to temporary
foreign workers who were admitted as non-immigrants would result
in a pool of laborers who would be ineligible for citizenship.226
2. Limited Immigration Enforcement
The end of the Bracero Program marked the return of another
strategy for managing the immigrant labor paradox—limited immi-
gration enforcement.227 When the program ended there was an
increase in the number of unauthorized migrants in the United
States.228 As sociologists Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren have
detailed, this increase is due in large part to the 1965 Immigration
Act.229 This significant piece of immigration reform eliminated the
national origin quotas that were first adopted in 1921.230 Therefore,
this Act is often viewed as critical for creating a more just and
equitable immigration system.231 However, that narrative privileges
the impact the act had on European immigrants rather than those
from Mexico and other parts of the Western Hemisphere.232 For
individuals from Mexico and other parts of the Western Hemisphere
the 1965 Immigration Act introduced numerical restrictions and
eliminated an important pathway for foreign workers to immigrate
to the United States.233
Three aspects of the 1965 Immigration Act changed Mexican
laborers lawful access to the United States: first, the introduction
of numerical restrictions; second, the failure to provide meaningful
access to green cards for low-wage workers; and third, the failure to
implement a robust temporary worker program.234 While the 1965
Immigration Act eliminated the national origin quotas, it created
new quotas for the Western Hemisphere.235 The Western Hemi-
sphere had always eluded numerical restrictions “in deference to the
need for labor in southwestern agriculture and American diplomatic
225. GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 180, at 52; CALAVITA, supra note 140, at 147–49.
226. Registry Act of 1929, Pub. L. No 70-962, §§ 1–4, 45 Stat. 1512, 1513.
227. See Saucedo, supra note 14, at 306.
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230. Id. at 2–3.
231. See id. at 1.
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233. Id. at 260–61.
234. See Immigration Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
235. See Massey & Pren, supra note 223, at 2–3.
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and trade interests with Canada and Mexico.”236 With the elimination
of the national origin quotas, many liberal reformers argued that it
would be inequitable to have per-country quotas for the Eastern
Hemisphere but not the Western Hemisphere.237 These advocates
were successful and the 1965 Immigration Act created 20,000 per
country quotas for the Eastern Hemisphere and a 120,000 quota for
the entire Western Hemisphere.238 This quota limited the number
of lawful permanent residents that could be admitted each year.239
This Western Hemisphere quota was not sufficient to provide access
to the 177,000 Mexican laborers who were admitted to the United
States in the last year of the Bracero Program.240 Additionally, quali-
tative restrictions—like not being likely to become a public charge—
would remain a challenge for laborers engaging in low-wage work.241
Finally, the 1965 Immigration Act did not include a robust tempo-
rary worker program.242 Growers and other agricultural employers
lobbied Congress to incorporate a temporary worker program into
the 1965 Immigration Act.243 The 1952 Immigration Act included a
small guest worker program—the H-2 program—and there were ef-
forts to get the Bracero Program folded into that program.244 How-
ever, the same interests that were against low-wage workers having
access to lawful permanent residence status objected to an expansion
of the H-2 temporary worker program.245 In 1964, the Department
of Labor issued regulations that “effectively exclude[ed] Braceros
from the H-2 program.”246 The regulation was intended to ensure that
“foreign workers will not be admitted where unemployed domestic
workers are available, and in no event, will be admitted under cir-
cumstances adversely affecting domestic wage levels.”247 Employers
would not be certified if they were “found to have had in his employ
after the effective date of these regulations, any foreign worker when
such employer knows or has reasonable grounds to believe or suspect
or by reasonable inquiry could have ascertained that such foreign
worker is not lawfully in the United States.”248 Then–Secretary of
236. NGAI, supra note 2, at 22.
237. See Saucedo, supra note 14, at 303–04.
238. Massey & Pren, supra note 223, at 1–2.
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Labor Willard Wirtz testified that the Department of Labor “did not
envision using the H2 [sic] program to replace the Bracero Program,”
and the ultimate interpretation of the H-2 regulations were narrow
and “the temporary Mexican labor pool was never fully absorbed
into the H-2 program.”249
As a result of the 1965 legislative reforms Mexican laborers who
continued to work in the United States overnight went from lawfully
present Braceros to unauthorized migrants without a pathway to
citizenship.250 These migrants were able to continue entering the
United States and employers were able to continue to hire these
migrants due to a long-standing history of limited immigration en-
forcement, particularly in border areas.251 Sociologist Kitty Calavita
explains that even during the Bracero Program the “Border Patrol
was notoriously reluctant to apprehend and deport illegal farm work-
ers during the harvest season or at other times of peak labor de-
mand.”252 For example, the Chief of the Border Patrol in Tucson,
Arizona explained that the El Paso District Director “issued orders
each harvest season to stop apprehending illegal Mexican farm
workers.”253 Calavita notes that “[t]his reluctance to detain illegal
farm workers was not confined to the idiosyncrasies of regional en-
forcement. Instead, it seems to have been the official policy through
much of the 1940s and early 1950s.”254
This approach to enforcement was not new during the Bracero
era. In the early 1920s after the World War I era temporary worker
program ended, unauthorized migration from Mexico increased.255
The creation of the Border Patrol in 1924 made unauthorized migra-
tion more difficult, which gave rise to increasing hostility by grow-
ers.256 From the growers’ perspective, the increased immigration
enforcement was “needless and unjustified harassment of their work-
ers.”257 Concerned that enthusiastic enforcement would jeopardize
their labor supply, growers complained to administrative officials in
249. Id. at 301–02.
250. Id. at 306.
251. CALAVITA, supra note 218, at 32–33.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 33.
254. Id. Additionally, during the Bracero Program there were times when there were
more bracero candidates than official slots. Id. at 32. At these times an increasing number
of Mexican laborers “took matters into their own hands, crossing the border illegally.”
Id. These laborers found that they were often able to become lawful participants in the
Bracero Program due to the policy of legalizing unauthorized migrants. CALAVITA, supra
note 218, at 28. This process was referred to as “drying out the wetbacks.” Id. For
example, between 1947 and 1949, 142,200 unauthorized migrants were “legalized and
contracted directly to growers,” and in 1950, the number was over 96,000. Id. at 28–29.
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Washington, D.C.258 The Immigration and Naturalization Service
district director for El Paso once testified that from the time he
assumed the position in March 1926,
nearly every year at cotton-chopping or cotton-picking time, the
farmers would send a complaint to the Secretary of Labor . . . or
to the Commissioner of Immigration, I am certain for no other
purpose than to cause an investigation that would result in one
of two things: Either I get word from some higher official to go
easy until cotton-chopping time was over, or cotton-picking time
was over; or the men who were doing the work would be so upset
by the investigation that they would go easy on their own.259
Administrative officials used limited enforcement as a tool for man-
aging the immigrant labor paradox. As long as these officials believed
that agricultural employers needed Mexican laborers, they would
“bow to grower influence and quietly relax its enforcement of immi-
gration laws.”260 This approach was desired because even these
administrative officials “opposed the permanent addition of Mexican
workers to the American population” because these workers were
abandoning the fields in search of better economic opportunities in
factories and “it was imperative [to the Labor Department and the
American Federation of Labor] that industry [factory jobs] remain
the exclusive province of white Americans.”261
Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, the unauthorized migrant
population in the United States grew.262 In 1965, approximately
37,000 unauthorized migrants entered the United States from
Mexico.263 When the 1965 Immigration Act became effective in 1968,
unauthorized migrant entries from Mexico had increased to approxi-
mately 100,000 individuals, while the number of temporary-worker
entries from Mexico dropped to zero.264 Temporary migrant admis-
sions would remain at zero through 1976 and unauthorized migrant
entries would rise to approximately 400,000 in 1974 and remain there
until 1976.265 By 2007, the unauthorized migrant population in the
258. Id.
259. Id. It should also be noted that at time growers viewed immigration officers as
an ally. Id. at 60 n.50. Historian Mark Reisler recounts that there were times when growers
would ask “immigration officers to arrest and quickly deport their illegal Mexican workers.
This occurred at the end of the season to avoid paying workers their due wages.” Id.
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United States reached a high of 12.2 million individuals.266 That
figure dropped to 10.5 million in 2017.267 In 2017, for the first time,
Mexicans were less than half of the unauthorized migrant popula-
tion.268 Mexican unauthorized migration has fallen while unautho-
rized migration from Central America and Asia has increased.269
The growth of the unauthorized migrant population in the United
States reflects the continued desire for foreign workers and limited
paths for the lawful admission of such workers combined with stra-
tegic enforcement.270 While immigration enforcement has become
much more robust and intrusive to the lives of unauthorized migrants,
late twentieth-century enforcement strategies reflect an intentional
response to the immigrant worker paradox.271
With the enactment of the immigration reforms of the 1920s,
the United States became a country in which it was nearly impossi-
ble for foreign-born workers who have been—and continue to be—
essential to the economic development and prosperity of the United
States to become formal members of society. Until that point, low-
wage foreign workers were eligible to naturalize.272 Naturalization
did not require LPR status because there was no meaningful differ-
ence between those who migrated with the intention of permanent
residence and those who planned a temporary visit.273 With the adop-
tion of the national origin quotas came a set of admissions restric-
tions that not only sought to limit the permanent residence of
Southern and Eastern European immigrants, but also that of low-
wage foreign workers more broadly.274 The immigration system ush-
ered in with the 1920s reforms reflected a new strategy for prioritizing
profitability in the face of growing opposition to immigrant-based
precarious labor.275 These reforms ensured that American workers
266. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 5 facts about illegal
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would see a decline in low-wage foreign workers from Southern and
Eastern Europe.276 However, employers in the agricultural, mining,
construction, and manufacturing industries would continue to have
access to sufficient labor due to immigration law and policy that
facilitated the migration of low-wage workers from Mexico.277
B. Ineligible for Citizenship
Noncitizens deemed undesirable have long been denied entry
into the United States and simultaneously denied access to citizen-
ship.278 The creation of immigration restrictions is reinforced with
related naturalization restrictions.279 The adoption of national origin
quotas in the 1920s created the most sweeping immigration re-
strictions since the Chinese Exclusion Act was adopted in 1882.280 In
both instances, the individuals who were denied entry into the United
States were deemed ineligible for naturalization.281 The Chinese Ex-
clusion Act accomplished this goal directly through a provision
stating, “no State court or court of the United States shall admit
Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in conflict with this act are hereby
repealed.”282 In 1929, the Registry Act prevented noncitizens from
naturalizing by refusing to accept declarations of intention “until
the lawful entry for permanent residence of such alien shall have been
established, and a certificate showing the date, place, and manner
of his arrival shall have been issued.”283 The national origin quotas
determined who would be able to enter the United States for perma-
nent residence and this type of entry became a requirement for
No. 68-139, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159–60 (establishing quotas for immigrants that may
lawfully enter from both hemispheres).
276. See Massey & Pren, supra note 223, at 2.
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three years prior to being naturalized. Naturalization Act of 1795, Pub. L. No. 3-20, § 1,
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naturalization.284 Prior to the 1929 Registry Act, it did not matter
whether an individual entered the United States for permanent
residence or a temporary stay.285 As long as the individual satisfied
the residence, knowledge, and loyalty requirements, that person could
become a citizen.286 Beginning in 1906, naturalization applicants
had to present a certificate stating the date, place, and manner of
their arrival to the United States.287 This requirement grew out of
concern that applicants would perjure themselves regarding their
length of residence in the United States.288 The new requirement
that applicants provide evidence of their lawful admission for per-
manent residence was a response to concerns that noncitizens were
evading the national origin quotas, entering the United States, and
becoming citizens.289
Since 1929, the LPR naturalization requirement has been an
important tool in reinforcing immigration restrictions.290 While the
rationale for immigration restrictions has shifted since the 1920s,
the United States’ immigration system continues to be organized
around the idea that immigration must be limited.291 The limits
today are based on family connections and employment opportuni-
ties or skills.292 Despite the country’s continued reliance upon low-
wage foreign workers, these workers face significant obstacles to
lawfully migrating to the United States. First, most low-wage work-
ers are ineligible for LPR status. The Immigration and Nationality
Act states that no more than 10,000 visas are available annually for
unskilled workers.293 However, those numbers are reduced by up to
5,000 per year to accommodate the provisions of the Nicaraguan and
Central American Relief Act.294 Between 2010 and 2018, an average
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of 3,000 foreign workers were admitted annually as lawful perma-
nent residents in the unskilled worker category.295 In March 2020,
workers in this category have been waiting anywhere from three to
twelve years to immigrate to the United States as an LPR.296 Sec-
ond, many low-skilled workers run the risk of being deemed inad-
missible for likelihood of becoming a public charge.297 Third, the more
robust pathways for entry into the United States as a low-skilled
worker only provide for non-immigrant status.298 These challenges
reflect the paradox around low-wage foreign workers.
The United States has a system that denies most low-wage for-
eign workers access to de jure membership as part of a great com-
promise between American industry and American workers. This
compromise allows industry to have access to the desired low-wage
foreign workers, but the manner in which it does so prohibits the
workers from becoming de jure members of American society. In addi-
tion to the legal rules and policies governing immigration and citizen-
ship, low-wage foreign workers are framed within public discourse as
economic, public safety, and cultural threats.299 This framing justifies
low-wage foreign workers’ exclusion from de jure membership. In
James Baldwin’s 1963 essay “A Talk to Teachers,” he explains that
[B]lack men were brought here as a source of cheap labor. They
were indispensable to the economy. In order to justify the fact
that men were treated as though they were animals, the white
republic had to brainwash itself into believing that they were,
indeed, animals, and deserved to be treated like animals.300
Baldwin’s words adeptly describe not only the United States’ approach
to enslaved labor, but also the country’s approach to low-wage
foreign workers from the Western Hemisphere, particularly Mexico.
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CONCLUSION
Citizenship law provides important information about the
boundaries of membership in democratic societies.301 The continued
use of the LPR naturalization requirement combined with few
opportunities for unauthorized migrants to regularize their status
reveals a paradox.302 Low-wage foreign workers are critical for the
economic growth and development of American society, yet they are
viewed as a threat to American society and denied opportunities to
be recognized as formal members of American society.303 The United
States’ long-standing response to the immigrant labor paradox is
unjust and untenable. The LPR naturalization requirement is an
attempt to reinforce immigration restrictions.304 Current immigration
law has few opportunities for low-wage foreign workers to enter the
United States as lawful permanent residents, yet numerous industries
rely on these workers.305 Consequently, the workers overwhelmingly
enter the United States without authorization or overstay temporary
non-immigrant visas.306 The failure to acknowledge the value that
these workers provide to American society—economically, socially, and
politically—is a threat to democratic governance. It is no longer pos-
sible to view unauthorized migrants as a temporary population in the
United States. The majority of unauthorized migrants have lived in
the United States for at least ten years and many have children and
spouses who are U.S. citizens.307 Their connections to American society
are significant. A state that claims to be a democracy derives its power
“from the consent of the governed.”308 The United States’ current ap-
proach to citizenship denies many of the governed the opportunity to
provide their consent. A jus nexi approach to citizenship allows our
country to more closely realize this hallmark aspect of democracy.
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